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We study tolerance and topology of random scale-free networks under attack and defense strategies
that depend on the degree k of the nodes. This situation occurs, for example, when the robustness
of a node depends on its degree or in an intentional attack with insufficient knowledge on the
network. We determine, for all strategies, the critical fraction pc of nodes that must be removed
for disintegrating the network. We find that for an intentional attack, little knowledge of the well-
connected sites is sufficient to strongly reduce pc. At criticality, the topology of the network depends
on the removal strategy, implying that different strategies may lead to different kinds of percolation
transitions.
PACS numbers: 89.75.Hc, 87.23.Ge
The observation that many real networks, such as the
Internet, the WWW, social and biological networks etc,
obey a power law distribution in their nodes connectivity
has inspired a new area of research [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8].
Such a network is constructed by nodes connected with
links, where the probability P (k) that a node has k links
is
P (k) ∼ k−γ , (1)
where γ is usually found to be between 2 < γ < 3.
The scale-free character of these networks, represented
by having no characteristic number of nodes per link,
gives rise to many different and usually unexpected re-
sults in many properties, as compared to lattice models
or even to small-world networks [1]. One important fea-
ture studied is the robustness of such a network under a
random node removal [9]. In general, the integrity of a
network is destroyed after a critical percentage pc of the
system nodes has been removed. For scale-free networks
it has been shown that pc = 1, i.e., in order to destroy
the network practically all nodes have to be removed [10].
In this Letter, we consider scale-free networks where
the robustness of a node depends on its connectivity.
This means that the probability of damaging a node ei-
ther by some kind of failure or by an external attack
depends on the degree k of the node. Examples are com-
puter networks and social networks. In a computer net-
work such as the Internet, usually the hubs that serve
many computers are built in a more robust way, so that
their probability of failure is smaller than for the others.
In a social network, members of a group that have more
links to others have a lower probability of leaving the
group. It is, however, also possible that nodes with more
links are less robust. For example, traffic on a network
induces high loads on highly connected nodes [11], which
in turn makes them more vulnerable to failures. In some
cases breakdowns are due to cascades of failures caused
by the dynamics of damage spreading [12]. In computer
networks many breakdowns are due to congestion build-
ing (see [13]).
The above examples represent internal properties of a
network, where the vulnerability of each node depends
on its degree. In addition, the probability of removing
a node can depend on its degree also due to external at-
tack strategy. For example, the most efficient attack is
an intentional attack where the highest degree nodes are
being removed with probability one. In this case, only
a small fraction p of removed nodes is sufficient to de-
stroy the network. This strategy, however, requires full
knowledge of the network topology in order to identify
the highest connected nodes. In many realistic cases, this
information is not available, and only partial knowledge
exists. Accordingly, in an intentional attack the high-
degree nodes can be removed only with a certain proba-
bility that will depend on k. In some networks, such as
Terror or Mafia networks those that are higher in the hi-
erarchy have more links and are less known, and therefore
the probability to remove them is smaller than those with
less links. In contrast, in normal social networks the sit-
uation is opposite: The better linked members are more
visible and therefore have a higher probability to be at-
tacked. Finally, our study also applies to immunization
strategies, where the high degree nodes are not always
known in advance, see also Dezso¨ and Baraba´si [14].
In all these examples, a valueW (ki) is assigned to each
node, which represents the probability that a node i with
ki links becomes inactive either by failure or under some
attack. Specifically, we focus on the family of functions,
W (ki) =
kαi∑N
i=1 k
α
i
, −∞ < α <∞, (2)
The parameter α can be the sum of two parameters,
α = α′ + α′′, which incorporates both intrinsic network
vulnerability (α′) and external knowledge of the system
(α′′). It is possible that although some highly connected
nodes are intrinsically vulnerable (α′ > 0), an internal
2defense strategy with α′′ < 0 will give the net result
α < 0 [15]. In this case, nodes with lower k are more
vulnerable, while for α > 0, nodes with larger k are more
vulnerable. The cases α = 0 and α → ∞ represent the
known random removal [9, 10] and the targeted inten-
tional attack [9, 10], respectively.
The choice of α can be related to the probability w
that in each attack, one of the n highest connected nodes
in a network of N nodes becomes inactive by failure or
attack. By definition
w =
∫ kmax
kn
P (k)W (k)dk∫ kmax
m P (k)W (k)dk
, (3)
where m denotes the minimum number and kmax ∼
N1/(γ−1) the maximum number of links a node can have.
kn is the minimum number of links of a node that belongs
to the n highest connected nodes. It is easy to verify that
for N ≫ n≫ 1, w is related to α and γ by
w =
1− n(γ−1−α)/(γ−1)mα+1−γ
1−N (γ−1−α)/(γ−1)mα+1−γ
(4)
Depending on the value of α, for fixed value of γ, we can
distinguish 3 different regimes.
(i) α > γ − 1: Here, w = 1, and an “attacker” is capable
of destroying all the highest nodes in the network. Even
though α is finite here, this case is fully equivalent to the
targeted intentional attack α→∞.
(ii) α = γ − 1: For this particular value of α, w depends
logarithmically on n and N , w = lnn/ lnN .
(iii) α < γ − 1: Here, w decreases with n/N by a power
law, w = (n/N)1−α/(γ−1). A special case is α = 0, where
effectively nodes are picked randomly and thus w = n/N .
In this case, it is difficult to destroy the network, and the
percolation threshold pc can even be pc = 1 for well-
connected networks (γ < 3) [9, 10]. For 0 < α ≤ γ −
1, the effective removal is better than random; w still
approaches zero for N approaching infinity, but less fast
than in the random case. As is shown later, this is enough
for the percolation threshold to be significantly smaller
than 1. Finally, for negative values of α, the fraction
w of the highest connected nodes that will be damaged
decreases much faster than in the random case. This
feature will have no effect on the percolation threshold
for 2 < γ ≤ 3, where pc = 1 already in the random
case. But for γ > 3, pc increases with increasing negative
values of α, as we show below.
From the above discussion it is clear that the regime
α > γ − 1 is in the same universality class as the inten-
tional attack, and α = 0 is identical to the random attack.
It is not clear if there are more universality classes and
if not, what is the border line between them. To study
this question, we have considered both numerical simula-
tions and analytical considerations. First we determine
the percolation thresholds as a function of the network
parameters γ, N and m, and on the ‘attack’ parameter
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FIG. 1: The ratio of non-spanning configurations vs the frac-
tion of removed nodes p. Lines are simulation data, from net-
works of N = 106 nodes, while the circles are the theoretical
critical points. a) Results from 100 different realizations of
networks with γ = 2.5. Left to right: α=4, 1, 0.5, 0.25 and
0. b) Results from 300 realizations of networks with γ = 3.5.
Left to right: α=4, 1, 0.5, 0, −0.5, and −1.
α. Then we study the universality classes by analyzing
the topology of the network at these thresholds.
In the numerical treatment and the analysis we use
random mixing for the network construction, where no
correlations exist between the connectivity of neighbor-
ing sites. We first construct the network for a given γ.
We fix the number of nodes N , as well as m and as-
sign the degree k (number of links) for each node by
drawing a random number from a power law distribution
P (k) ∼ k−γ . We then randomly select pairs of links be-
tween nodes that have not yet reached their preassigned
connectivity and have not already been directly linked
to each other. We repeat this selection until the entire
network has been created.
To find the percolation thresholds pc, we choose suc-
cessively nodes with probability W (k) (see Eq. 2) and
remove them. When a node is removed all its links are
cut. After each removal, we calculate 〈k2〉 and 〈k〉. If
κ = 〈k2〉/〈k〉 ≥ 2, a spanning cluster exists in the net-
work. We repeat this procedure for a large number of
configurations (typically 100-300). For each concentra-
tion p of removed nodes we determine the probability
F∞ that a spanning cluster does not exist. We obtain pc
from the condition F∞ = 1/2, as is shown in Fig. 1 for
γ = 2.5 and 3.5 and several α values between 4 and -1.
The width of the dispersion in F∞ gives an upper bound
for the error bars for pc.
In the analytical treatment, we assume that sites are
chosen for deletion according to their initial connectivity.
A site is chosen with probability kα/N〈kα〉. After d dele-
tion attempts, the probability that a site of connectivity
k has not been deleted is
ρ(k) =
(
1−
kα
N〈kα〉
)d
≈ e−dk
α/N〈kα〉 . (5)
The condition for the existence of a spanning cluster after
the attack is as follows: a site is reached through a link
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FIG. 2: (a) Values of pc vs γ for different α values: (bottom
to top) α = 4, 1, 0.5, 0,−0.5,−1. Symbols represent simula-
tion data (N = 106 nodes) from 100 − 300 different network
realizations. Solid lines are the theoretical predictions for
finite-size networks, while dashed lines correspond to infinite-
size networks. Lower cutoff: m = 1, (b) Values of pc vs α
for infinite-size networks and different γ values. Lower cutoff
m = 1 (c) Same as (a), with lower cutoff: m = 2, and (d)
Same as (b), with lower cutoff: m = 2.
with probability kP (k)/〈k〉 and is still functional with
probability ρ(k). If the average number of outgoing links
(k − 1) per site is larger than 1, a spanning cluster will
exist. This consideration is formulated by:
kmax∑
k=m
P (k)k(k − 1)
〈k〉
e−qck
α
= 1 , (6)
where q ≡ d/N〈kα〉, and qc is the value of q at criticality.
To find the fraction of removed sites, one numerically
solves Eq. (6) to calculate qc and substitutes this value
for calculating the critical threshold of removed sites:
pc =
∑
P (k)ρ(k) =
kmax∑
k=m
P (k) exp(−qck
α) . (7)
Equation (7) describes the percolation threshold pc for
a given network of N nodes with exponent γ, as a func-
tion of the attack parameter α.
The lines in Fig. 2 represent the solutions of Eqs. (6)
and (7) and are in excellent agreement with the simu-
lations (in symbols). Remarkably, for γ < 3, pc be-
comes smaller than 1 already for very small positive α
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FIG. 3: Average shortest distance 〈l〉 between any two nodes
of the giant cluster at criticality as a function of the clus-
ter size Nc. The results correspond to networks of initially
N = 104, 105, and 106 nodes. 1000 different configurations
have been used for each N , except for N = 106 (100 configu-
rations). The data have been logarithmically binned, and the
results have been vertically shifted for presentation clarity.
The values of α and γ are shown in the plot. The lines repre-
sent the theoretical slopes of (top to bottom): 1/2, 1/3.5, 1/3,
and 1/2.33, respectively. Inset: Semi-logarithmic plot for the
case of γ = 2.5 and α = 0.
values, and decays rapidly with increasing α. Accord-
ingly, by a very small preference probability to remove
highly connected nodes, which arises, for example, in
an intentional attack with very little knowledge of the
network structure, this network can be destroyed by re-
moving a comparatively small fraction of nodes. Above
α = γ − 1, pc saturates, which means that the knowl-
edge available to the attacker in this case is sufficient to
destroy the network most efficiently. From Figs. 2a and
c one might conclude that negative values of α might
lead to pc = 1 also for γ values above 3. We tested this
question numerically and found that for all values of γ
values between 3 and 4 and negative α, the percolation
threshold pc is below 1. For large negative values of α
and γ > 3, the critical threshold can be approximated by
pc = 1− (γ−1)
[
2
(
γ−3
γ−2
)
m2−γ
] γ−1
γ−3
, which is below 1 for
all γ > 3 and m ≥ 2.
To study the effect of the different attack strategies on
the topology of the network just before disruption, we
analyzed the topology of the network at the percolation
transition for different values of γ and α. We characterize
the topology by the way the average shortest topological
distance 〈l〉 between two nodes scales with the cluster
size Nc. We expect that Nc scales with 〈l〉 as Nc ∼
〈l〉dℓ , where dℓ is the topological (“chemical”) dimension.
Using a mean-field type approximation Ref. [16], it has
4been suggested that for random removal,
dℓ =
γ − 2
γ − 3
, 3 < γ < 4, (8)
while for the intentional attack
dℓ = 2 , γ > 2. (9)
The power-law dependence 〈l〉 ∼ N
1/dℓ
c is very differ-
ent from the logarithmic dependence 〈l〉 ∼ logN found
in scale-free networks for p well above pc and γ > 3.
Accordingly, due to the attacks, the network becomes
very inefficient, since the distances between the nodes
increase drastically, from a logarithmic to a power-law
dependence on the total number of nodes. Equations
(8) and (9) suggest that random removal and intentional
attack are in different universality classes. This implies
that the critical properties of the percolation transition
depend on the way the transition is being approached,
which is quite unusual in critical phenomena. To test
these predictions and to see if there are further univer-
sality classes, we studied numerically how, at criticality,
〈l〉 scales with Nc, for different networks and different
attack parameters α.
Figure 3 shows simulation results for 〈l〉 as a function
of Nc for several values of γ and α. For α > 0, the
data scale quite nicely and yield a slope very close to
1/2 (corresponding to dl = 2) for all γ values, being
identical to the theoretical prediction, Eq. (9), for the
α = ∞. This shows that all attacks with α > 0 fall
into the same universality class. The figure also verifies
the prediction of Eq. (8) for random removal (α = 0)
when γ > 3. It shows, in addition, that attacks with
α < 0 result almost in the same network structure as for
α = 0, and yield the same topological dimension. Thus,
for a given network with γ > 3 the same network can
undergo transitions of two universality classes: a) α > 0
(universality class of the targeted intentional attack), and
b) α ≤ 0 (universality class of random removal).
For 2 < γ < 3 and α ≤ 0, the situation is less conclu-
sive. Here, it is difficult to distinguish between a logarith-
mic or a power-law dependence, as can be seen from the
inset of Fig. 3. Since for the pure network, 〈l〉 ∼ log logN
[16], also a simple logarithmic dependence 〈l〉 ∼ logN
will lead to a strong increase of the mean distance be-
tween the nodes at criticality, as suggested by the inset.
In summary, we have studied the network tolerance un-
der different attack strategies. We find that little knowl-
edge on the highly connected nodes in an intentional at-
tack reduces the threshold drastically compared with the
random case. For example, when in a scale-free network
with γ = 2.5 the one percent highest connected nodes
are known with probability w = 0.2 (corresponding to
α = 1), the threshold reduces from pc = 1 for the ran-
dom case (w = 0) to pc ∼= 0.25. When all hubs are
known (w = 1), pc is close to 0.07. This shows that for
example the Internet (see also [17]) can be damaged ef-
ficiently when only a small fraction of hubs is known to
the attacker. Moreover, this result is also relevant for
immunization of populations: Even if the virus spread-
ers are known (and immuned) with small probability, the
spreading threshold can be reduced significantly. We also
showed that even if the attack does not yet disintegrate
the network, there is nevertheless a major damage on the
network, since the distances between the nodes increase
significantly and any transport process on the net may
become inefficient. Our results show that the topology
of the network close to criticality, characterizing the uni-
versality class of the phase transition, depends on the
strategy of node removal.
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